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19 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

Background Information on Standing Federal
Bureau of Investigation Requirements

- 1. The attached appalling compendium (Tab A) is a listing of the current FBI requirements for coverage of citizens and/or organizations which can be cited as subversive or in possible violation of certain Titles and U.S. Codes.
- 2. Also attached (Tab B) is a listing of MHCHAOS outgoing cables from 1 September 1973 through 28 February 1974. It is obvious that if we continue to service FBI requirements in these areas, we shall remain fairly heavily committed to provide information on the activities of U.S. citizens abroad.
- 3. On the other hand, the Bureau requests appear legitimate and the refinement of their requirements is going to be difficult. None-theless, we should probably adhere to the position that we shall act only on individual cases for which we have written requests from the Bureau.

 Attached in accordance with your request is a draft memorandum from the DCI to the Director, FBI, suggesting a review of the problem.

Attachments: A/S





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DRAFT

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C.

In the past the Agency has serviced requests from the Bureau for information on certain American citizens abroad who have allegedly been affiliated with subversive movements. We believe that this activity is subject to being misconstrued as the Agency's operating against United States citizens.

We have, therefore, directed our field stations to focus clearly on foreign organizations and individuals of CIA interest and only incledentally on their American contacts. When information is uncovered as a by-product of CIA foreign-targeted intelligence or counterintelligence operations abroad which makes private Americans abroad suspect for security or counterintelligence reasons, the information will be reported to the FBI. Specific CIA operations will not be mounted against such individuals.

We should like to suspend fulfilling the standing requirements from your Bureau until we have an opportunity to have a full discussion with you in terms of examining how we can carry on.

William E. Colby



